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Abstract Designing and implementing security protocols is a diÆcult task. A
graphical specication environment helps one to cope with this com-
plexity by enabling the visualization of hierarchical message structures
and providing suitable abstraction and encapsulation so that designers
can retain a high-level perspective while also being free to hone in on the
details of the design. The graphical interface framework described in
this paper isolates the critical issues in a protocol design and presents the
user with an appropriate level of detail. This is accomplished through
the use of a high-level view of the message ow and a more detailed com-
ponent view that shows the structure of each protocol message. Each
view can be easily manipulated by using standard graphical interface
mechanisms such as drag-and-drop and context specic pop-up menus.
An added advantage of this interface is that it is possible to connect to
analysis or code generation routines via a GGSE-API.
Keywords: Security Modelling, protocol engineering, CASE tools
1. INTRODUCTION
The design and engineering of security protocols is widely recognized
to be a very challenging and diÆcult task since protocols that appear
secure can contain subtle aws and vulnerabilities which attackers can
exploit [2, 1]. As a result of this fact, it is imperative that security CASE
tools be developed and used eectively in order to facilitate the creation
of more secure and reliable cryptographic protocols.
All CASE tools require an interface to specify the system to be de-
signed, implemented and possibly analyzed. To facilitate the eÆcient,
timely and accurate specication of a security protocol, a usable and
expressive graphical interface is required. A graphical specication en-
vironment helps designers to cope with the complexity of modern se-
curity protocols by enabling the visualization of hierarchical message
structures, such as encryptions and hashes, and providing suitable ab-
straction and encapsulation mechanisms so that designers can retain a
high-level perspective on the working of the protocol.
This paper describes a Generic Graphical Specication Environment
(GGSE) that was developed for use with security CASE tools. Section 2
gives guidelines for creating a specication environment. In Section 3
we describe the GGSE framework from a potential user's perspective,
while Section 4 elaborates on its architectural principles. We conclude
in Section 5.
2. DESIGN INTERFACE GUIDELINES
Any tool that is concerned with designing and engineering crypto-
graphic protocols should provide a design module that facilitates the
rapid and accurate specication of a protocol, but at the same time
is exible enough to accommodate new types of protocols and security
methods.
To dene a security protocol, the following two steps are necessary:
1 The principals that are involved in the protocol must be declared.
2 The message passing specication must be clearly represented and
must also accurately describe the working of the protocol.
Secondary to these requirements, the underlying structure of compo-
nents within each message could be clearly dened to enable source code
generation or analyses. External functions that are to be applied to the
message components may also be dened. The linkage between these
external functions and generated source code must be made explicit.
Communications settings, such as transport protocols and instance time-
outs, can also be specied, and lastly information specic to security or
performance analysis may be declared. This could include details such
as initial beliefs and possessions of principals and pre-recorded protocol
timings.
Thus, the goal of a design module should be to provide an intuitive
interface which distils the critical issues and presents a designer with an
appropriate level of detail, thereby allowing for the rapid and accurate
specication of security protocols. Essentially, this implies that the in-
terface should be graphical in nature. Components of this GUI should
be written to ensure that compulsory steps in the specication process
are clear and simple to complete. The importance and relevance of in-
formation that is related to other engineering phases should be clearly
indicated and required only when necessary.
3. THE GGS ENVIRONMENT
The GGS environment is divided into two views. The high-level proto-
col view shows the overall message ow, indicating clearly and concisely
what the protocol messages are and the principals that send and receive
them. The more detailed component view displays each message as a hi-
erarchical tree and allows the properties of each individual item within
the tree to be manipulated. Besides allowing a protocol to be designed
in these two views, the specication environment also ensures that a
protocol can be saved and exported to various formats, such as text or
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Figure 1 An illustration of the high-level protocol view on the left and the component
view on the right, as implemented in the SPEAR II tool.
3.1. HIGH-LEVEL PROTOCOL VIEW
The high-level protocol view can be considered as a front-end to the
protocol design module. Its main purpose is to provide a suitable ab-
straction and encapsulation mechanism so that designers can retain a
high-level perspective of the operation of the protocol. An illustration
of an implementation of the high-level view is shown in Figure 1.
The Message Sequence Chart (MSC) [6] syntax forms the basis for
the high-level protocol view that is used to represent the exchange of
messages within a protocol. In the chosen MSC-type representation,
communicating principals are specied as axes. Each message is rep-
resented by two message boxes, a convex box and a concave box. The
sending and receiving principals are designated through the placement
of these message boxes | the convex box indicating the sender, and the
concave box indicating the recipient. Messages are ordered sequentially
in time, with the earlier messages at the top of a principal axis, and
the later messages near the bottom of the axis. Within each message a
textual representation is displayed, showing the contents of the message.
The high-level view can be fully manipulated through drag-and-drop
operations. A message can be reordered in time by either dragging it
up or down along an axis. The sender and receiver can also be changed
by dragging either the convex or the concave message box onto a new
principal axis to signify the new sender or receiver respectively. The
principal axes can also be repositioned to `neaten' or simplify the ap-
pearance of the specication. Note that movement of the principal axes
does not change the functioning of the protocol in any respect.
The attributes of a message or principal can be modied by using
the message or principal pop-up menu which appears when clicking on
the button in the respective graphical representation. Setting the at-
tributes of a message will initiate the component view dialog so that
the individual components within the message can be initialized. Using
the relevant pop-up menu, the selected message or principal can also be
deleted. When a principal is deleted, all the messages that it sends and
receives are also erased. The ability to duplicate a message is provided by
the message pop-up menu. The high-level view also provides an undo
and redo feature to ensure that designers can recover from accidental
message and principal moves, deletions and edits.
A problem inherent in this MSC-type representation is that if a mes-
sage contains many components then the corresponding message box
can span too far across or even o the visible canvas area. This problem
was solved by allowing the designer to specify a maximum message box
width so that any message box exceeding this size would be truncated.
However, to allow the designer to identify a message, tooltips were added
to the message boxes so that the entire message contents are displayed
when hovering over the button embedded in each box.
3.2. COMPONENT VIEW
The component view is a drag-and-drop environment that uses a hier-
archical tree representation to show the relative structure of components
in a message. A sample implementation of this view is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. Each node in the tree represents a component and can either be
empty or contain further components. There are thirteen primary com-
ponents:
Non-terminal components include functions, hashes, symmetric
encryptions, public-key encryptions, private-key encryptions and
groups.
Terminal components include nonces, timestamps, shared secrets,
symmetric keys, public keys, private keys and user-dened compo-
nents.
Components can only be added to a non-terminal node. To add a
component, the component view pop-up menu is used. A sample layout
for this menu is illustrated in Figure 2. It is possible to cut, copy, paste
and order nodes using either keyboard shortcuts, the pop-up menu or
dragging operations with a pointer device. When cutting or copying a
non-terminal node, all the nodes contained therein are also cut or copied,
allowing entire subtrees to be moved.
Copies of components can be made across messages due to a shared
clipboard that holds the copied items. However, when making copies
Figure 2 An illustration of a pop-up menu that allows components to be added and
modied on the left and a likely properties dialog for a symmetric encryption on the
right.
a reference is transferred, not an actual copy of the component. This
means that only one instance of a given component will exist in memory,
ensuring that consistency is maintained when a component appears in
more than one message.
The component view pop-up menu is used to activate the proper-
ties dialog for a selected component. Each component type has its own
distinct properties dialog that can be used to set its attributes | for
example, a possible properties dialog for a symmetric encryption com-
ponent is illustrated in Figure 2. The attributes for a component can
include information specic for code generation, initialization data for
further analysis methods, or a host of other records necessary to describe
the component.
Certain components can contain other component types as one of
their attributes | for example, an encryption must specify the key being
used. In these cases, it is essential that these aggregated components be
accessible in component properties dialogs. In the case of encryptions,
all the keys that exist in the protocol specication are accessible from
any given encryption properties dialog. This means that a key can be
specied in one message, and then used for an encryption in another
message. Essentially the guiding principle is that all components which
can be aggregated must be available for inclusion in the properties dialog
of the components that can contain them. The illustration in Figure 2
shows how all the symmetric keys within a protocol are accessible from
the symmetric encryption properties dialog.
4. THE GGSE FRAMEWORK
Creating a GUI design interface is often a tedious and time-consuming
development task. The GGSE provides an existing GUI environment in
which a security protocol can be easily and intuitively specied. By
leveraging o the GGSE, protocol modelling tools which require a GUI
design environment will be much simpler to develop. Information that
has been specied through the GGSE GUI can be retrieved by using the
supplied GGSE-API. The GGSE framework also provides the ability to
expand the functionality already provided by the design environment.
4.1. STORAGE STRUCTURES
Within the GGSE framework, ve signicant items are stored for later
retrieval, manipulation and querying by design and analysis procedures.
Interaction with the GGSE revolves around these data storage items.
The storage classes, each of which contains appropriate attributes and
methods, are listed below:
1 The role-players in the protocol.
2 The messages transmitted during a protocol session.
3 Hierarchical trees which store the components for each message.
4 Components which are subclassed for each cryptographic type and
form the nodes in the hierarchical tree.
5 A controller which stores information related to the protocol ren-
dering and also deals with user interaction.
The principals in the protocol are stored within a dynamic list struc-
ture. Information concerning messages and their order is stored in a
similar construct. Principal objects do not aggregate the messages which
they send and receive since this makes it diÆcult to determine ordering
information without including some form of extra information. Instead,
the list of messages is an independent and ordered structure and princi-
pals contain references to the messages which they originate and receive.
A binary sibling-child tree is used to store the message components hi-
erarchically. Most operations on this tree, such as walking, pruning and
grafting, then break down to simple recursive functions.
4.2. BASELINE FUNCTIONALITY
Rendering the protocol to the canvas allows the user to interact with
the model in memory. Whenever the model is drawn, the GGSE records
where each principal and message was placed so that user interaction
points can be accurately interpreted and responded to by either allowing
the selected object to be dragged or a context-sensitive pop-up menu to
be displayed.
Dragging-and-dropping operations are fundamental to the working of
the GGSE. On the canvas, dragging-and-dropping is implemented by
determining the principal or message to be moved and then drawing an
XORed representation before nally determining whether the desired
placement is valid and updating the model in memory. The manipulation
and rendering of the component tree occurs in a standard tree-view,
similar to those provided by the majority of GUI-based programming
interfaces and class libraries. Thus, operations such as drag-and-drop,
non-terminal node expansion and contraction, and tree rendering can all
be performed by using the supplied tree-view API.
The ability to edit and manipulate the component tree is vital. How-
ever, this tree must be `attached' to the GUI tree-view before any editing
can occur. Thus, an important function which the GGSE provides is the
ability to associate each item stored in the component tree with one of
the nodes displayed in the tree-view. When the user manipulates the
tree-view, the GGSE ensures that the component tree remains in syn-
chronization. This ensures that pruning and grafting of the tree-view
will be reected in the organization of components within the hierarchi-
cal component tree.
Maintaining the tree model involves many standard tree operations,
such as node or subtree additions, deletions and repositionings. The un-
derlying API for the component tree model attempts to be as extensive
as possible, ensuring that programmers can easily walk the tree, modify
and shift nodes around and retrieve and present the information which
they require.
As we have seen, components which can be aggregated within other
components should be accessible from all the appropriate properties di-
alog boxes. To facilitate this objective, the GGSE provides functions
to extract all the components of a given type from the component tree.
These components are placed into a list, allowing their details to be re-
trieved through simple method calls. This retrieval ability could also be
used to aid in future analysis methods that need to examine only specic
types of components to draw conclusions.
4.3. EXPANDING FUNCTIONALITY
The functionality of any interface should be easily upgradeable so
that further information can be provided to aid in other analysis tech-
niques. To upgrade the GGSE so that a user can specify a protocol more
extensively the following dialogs must be extended:
The necessary component dialogs.
The message properties dialog which is accessed in the component
view by selecting the root tree node.
The principal properties dialog.
The protocol properties dialog which is accessible from a pull-down
or pop-up menu.
Each of these dialogs would then update the relevant data structures
when closed. Finally, API calls would then have to be added to the
aected classes so that the new data can be extracted.
4.4. GGSE-API
The API that is provided to the `outside world' allows a programmer
to retrieve all the information specied in the high-level and component
views. The following are some of the major API calls which are provided:
Methods to return the list of principals and then query each of
these principals.
Procedures to obtain the list of messages along with methods to
query each of these messages.
Methods to return the component tree and then to query this tree
and extract terminal and non-terminal nodes in a random-access
fashion, or in the order in which they have been specied. The
ability to obtain a attened version of the component tree is also
provided for display purposes.
Routines to determine the type of each component in the tree and
to obtain all the relevant information describing it.
Additional API calls provide for the ability to manipulate the princi-
pal and message lists, export protocol data to other formats and streams
to provide for interoperability with other tools and, lastly, to customize
display settings on the display canvas.
5. CONCLUSION
In order to facilitate the eÆcient, timely and accurate specication
of a security protocol, a design interface is required that will distil the
critical issues and present the user with an appropriate level of detail.
This will allow protocol designers to concentrate on the issues at hand,
instead of having to battle with a cryptic design environment.
The GUI framework presented in this paper achieves this goal by
creating two distinct protocol views, each providing suÆcient informa-
tion to facilitate the rapid and eÆcient specication of a protocol. The
high-level protocol view shows the overall message ow, while the more
detailed component view clearly displays the structure of each message.
Manipulating either of these views is achieved through simple graphical
operations and facilities such as dragging and dropping and context spe-
cic pop-up menus. The design environment is also supported by full
redo and undo functionality as well as le save, load and export facilities.
The GGSE which has been described in this paper has been imple-
mented in the SPEAR II security CASE tool [5, 3]. At present we are
investigating the integration of other security tools and techniques with
the GGSE framework, using SPEAR II as a reference implementation.
An exciting project that we envisage is allowing interoperability with the
CAPSL specication language [4]. This would entail allowing a protocol
dened in the GGSE to be exported to CAPSL and vise versa.
From our work with the SPEAR II project, we can conclude that a
security interface such as the one which we have proposed in this paper
is of tremendous benet. The GGSE essentially provides a exible and
extensible way in which a security protocol designer can interact with a
number of diverse and distinct engineering and analysis services, while
at the same time providing each of these with the necessary information
to run to completion. In the complex arena of security protocol design,
an environment such as this is sorely needed.
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